Abstract-In this paper, we consider multiple primary and multiple secondary users cooperative cognitive radio networks, in which the primary users (PUs) lease a portion of their spectrum to the secondary users (SUs) for some revenue, and in return the SUs play as relays and help forward the data of the Pus in exchange for being granted spectrum opportunities. Both the PUs and SUs aim to maximize their own utilities. The spectrum leasing and relay selection problem is studied. We formulate the spectrum leasing problem as a Stackelberg game, and transform the relay selection problem as an assignment problem which is solved by the Hungarian method. Numerical results show that, under the proposed cooperative spectrum leasing-optimal-relay-selection scheme, both the primary and secondary network can achieve high utilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The available spectrum resources for wireless communications are becoming increasingly scarce due to rapidly increasing traffic demands in certain situations. Cognitive radio technology is being proposed and adopted to improve the spectrum utilization [1] . Secondary users (SUs) can coexist with licensed users, so called primary users (PUs), on the same spectral resource, provided that they do not cause harmful interference to the PU. The SUs sense and exploit the spectrum licensed to the PUs when they are idle. In addition, in an interference limited model, the SUs can use the spectrum being occupied by the PUs if they do not cause harmful interference to the PUs.
Dynamic spectrum access schemes are proposed to address spectrum sharing problems and are based on perfect or imperfect spectrum sensing [2] , [3] . In [4] , the authors have proposed the concept of dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) as a new paradigm for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) in cognitive radio networks, in which the PUs can lease a portion of their spectrum resource to the SUs in return for revenue. The pricing issue has been studied in a competitive cognitive radio network in which the primary service provider charges the secondary users based on their transmitted power levels to enhance its own revenue, and the secondary users strategically adjust their uplink transmission power levels to maximize their own utilities [5] .
In recent years, cooperative relay technologies have been incorporated into cognitive radio to help the SU coexist with the PU [6] . Cooperative cognitive radio is a promising paradigm for both primary and secondary networks. Cooperative communication techniques can be applied in cognitive radio networks by making the PU cooperate with the SU. The application of the cooperative communication concept in cognitive radio networks can be classified into three categories: i) cooperation among primary user peers; ii) cooperation among secondary user peers; and iii) cooperation between primary users and secondary users [7] . In the third kind of cooperation, the secondary users help the primary users forward their data and do not cause interference to the primary users, and in return, the primary user will release part of their spectrum to the secondary users. Both the primary and secondary users can obtain mutual benefit from the cooperation.
Usually, the PU is selfish, so besides earning some revenue form leasing spectrum, the PU would like to obtain additional benefits. The work [8] has proposed a spectrum leasing scheme where the PUs lease their spectrum to the cooperating secondary ad hoc networks in return for an improved quality of service (QoS). In [9] , the problem of dynamic spectrum leasing in a spectrum secondary market is considered, where secondary service providers lease spectrum from spectrum brokers to provide service to secondary users. Spectrum leasing via multiple primary users is formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem, and solutions to the problem are proposed with different signaling requirements among the primary users [10] . In an uplink code division multiple access (CDMA) network, the base station leasing spectrum to the SUs while the SUs pay for their inference power, and this price-based power control problem can be formulated as a Stackelberg game [11] .
The authors of [12] have proposed an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)-based cooperative communication scheme joint with spectrum leasing where the spectrum is leased in both frequency and time domains. In [13] , multiple PUs and multiple SUs operate on one channel using TDMA, with the PUs charging the SUs at the same price. In this paper, we propose a cooperative spectrum leasing and optimal relay selection scheme in a scenario where multiple PUs and multiple SUs operate on multiple channels. We consider a utility based cooperative spectrum leasing (CSL) communication model where multiple PUs actively cooperate with multiple SUs, and the SUs play the game as the relays and help forward the PUs' data in return for some spectrum access opportunities. The PUs charge the SUs at different prices due to different channel conditions between them. Thus, as the PUs own the spectrum, it is reasonable that they select the suitable SUs as their relays and lease spectrum to them in order to maximize the utility of the primary network. The SUs rent proper spectrum access time to maximize their utilities. However, the PU would not like to lease part of the spectrum to the SU unless its QoS is guaranteed. In our work, we have investigated following problems: a) the preconditions for cooperation, i.e. when the PU and the SU would like to cooperate with each other; b) the pricing issue, i.e. what the price the PU charges the SU for spectrum; c) the spectrum renting problem, i.e. how much spectrum the SU will rent to maximize its utility; d) optimal relay section, i.e. which SU the PU would like to select as its relay.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and assumptions, and introduces the utility functions for the primary and secondary network respectively. In Section III, we analyze preconditions of the cooperative spectrum leasing which is formulated as a Stackelberg game, and the Hungarian method is adopted to solve the relay selection problem. To evaluate the proposed cooperative spectrum leasing scheme, we present a range of simulation results and analyze the performance of the cooperative spectrum leasing in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Architecture and Assumptions
In our previous work [14] , we assume there is only one primary user and secondary user. Here we consider a cognitive radio system where M primary user link pairs and N secondary user link pairs coexist within the same area, associated with a central controller (CC) which has the information about the entire system, as shown in Fig.1.(a) . A primary link pair consists of a primary transmitter (PT) and a primary receiver (PR), with the secondary link being specified in a similar way. It is assumed that each PU and SU can only transmit on one channel. Each PU has a unique licensed channel and can lease a portion of channel access time to the SU in exchange for cooperation. One SU can be the relay and will help only one PU relay message, and one PU can only lease to at most one SU. Therefore, there are M individual channels and N relays in the cooperative cognitive radio network. The primary network can at most select $M$ SUs as the relays for the PUs. In a practical network, the PUs are rational and selfish, they lease their spectrum to obtain some revenue besides cooperation. The CC decides the relay selection and spectrum leasing for the PUs and SUs. We assume that the PUs always have data to transmit and the SU would like to cooperate with the PU as a relay because it benefits from the spectrum leasing once it rents some spectrum from the PUs. The primary network aims to maximize its revenue obtained from cooperation while guaranteeing the QoS for every PU. The secondary network aims to maximize its utility obtained from spectrum leasing. In this work, a decode-and-forward method is adopted as the cooperative relay scheme, and this can be easily extended to other cooperative relay schemes (e.g. 
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B. Utility Functions of the Primary and Secondary Network
The objective of the primary network is to maximize its revenue which consists of energy saving and spectrum leasing reward while keeping nominal data rate for all the PUs. We use the satisfaction function 
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According to the definitions of , pi U and , sj U , they are both greater than 0. The primary and secondary networks aim to maximize their individual utility respectively. It is reasonable to assume that the primary network aims to maximize its utility, as the primary network owns the spectrum resource, and that the secondary network tries to maximize its utility on this premise. We assume that the CC has the information about the primary and secondary network, obtained via control links between the CC and the primary and secondary users. In order to maximize the utility of the primary network, the CC determines the best relay selection strategy for the primary network. The CC needs to solve the optimization problem as follows.
OP1: 
The constraints (12), (13) and (14) show that one PU can at most select one SU as its relay, and the SU can be the relay of at most one PU. This is a mixed-integer nonlinear programming problem and is NP hard. To solve the problem, the CC needs to determine the relay selection {} section, we will decompose the problem as two coupled problems.
III. PROPOSED SPECTRUM LEASING AND RELAY SELECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we first study the preconditions of the cooperation between the PU and SU; we formulate the spectrum leasing problem as a Stackelberg game and give the optimal strategies to solve the problem. We then propose the optimal relay selection algorithm based on the spectrum leasing strategies.
A. Preconditions of Cooperation
The PUs and SUs are rational and selfish, given that the PUs would like to lease a portion of their spectrum to the SUs and the SUs would like to help the SUs forward their messages only when they can obtain some revenue from the cooperation. It is assumed that there is a 
In this decode-and-forward (DF) cooperative relay system, in order to guarantee the QoS of the PU, the cooperative data rate of the
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The j SU transmits with the maximum power , Sj P , so from (19) and (20) 
It is proved that the primary system gets the optimal performance and the primary user can save the most power when 
From (18) and (23) 
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This is a multi-objective optimization problem, where both the PU and SU are rational and selfish, and which is targeted at maximizing their individual utility. The PU owns the spectrum and it is reasonable to assume that the PU decides what price it charges the SU. The SU decides the amount of the spectrum it will rent sequentially. Therefore, it is a typical Stackelberg game in which the PU plays as the leader, while the SU plays as the follower [17] 
We analyze the game using backward induction method which is divided into two steps [19] . In the first step, it is assumed that the price ij c is fixed, and the j SU determines the optimal spectrum access time ( 
C. Optimal Relay Selection Algorithm
From the above analysis, we know that when the relay selection has been determined, the PU will decide the price it will charge the SU (its relay), and the SU decides the amount of time it will rent to maximize its own utility under the price. Consequently, for any given relay selection, the price c and the leased time duration are determined. We transform the optimization problem OP1 to OP2:
subject to (12) , (13), (14) and OP2 actually is the relay selection problem, and is a 0-1 knapsack problem [20] which can be converted to an assignment problem, and in this work, we adopt the Hungarian method to solve the relay selection problem. The Hungarian method is a combinatorial optimization algorithm which solves the assignment problem in polynomial time [21] . Problem OP2 can be transformed to OP3:
subject to (22) and (28), (14), (35) 
From the above analysis, we know that 0 ij u  . In particular, when (22) and (28) We can obtain the optimal relay selection result using the Hungarian method. However, the situation exists where some of the PUs directly transmit to their destinations and do not choose any SU as its relay. Specifically, when 
Once, the optimal relay selection is determined, and the spectrum leasing strategies 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
To evaluate the proposed cooperation scheme, we consider a geometrical model where the CC is located at the center of a circle. The radius of the circle is 1000 meters, and the PU link pairs and SU link pairs are uniformly distributed within this area. There are 10 primary link pairs in the system, which means there are 10 channels. The average distance between primary transmitters and receivers is 2 3 km. Assume that the distances between the SU link pairs are the same and are 200 meters. We assume that the path loss exponent is 4 and Rayleigh multipath fading is present. All the powers are measured in watts. The noise power is 13 10  watts on each channel. For simplicity, In order to show the performance of our cooperative spectrum leasing and relay selection, we compare it with the following two schemes: one is non-cooperative spectrum leasing (NCSL) with optimal relay selection, where the secondary users do not help relay the data of the PUs; the other is cooperative spectrum leasing with random relay selection, in which the PU randomly selects the a SU as its relay. The simulation results are obtained by averaging over 10,000 channel realizations.
In our model, the number of the secondary users is an important parameter as the secondary users act as relays of the primary users, which can bring cooperative diversity. The traffic demands of the SUs decide how much spectrum the SUs would like to rent, and this will affect the price strategies of the PUs. Fig. 3 shows the utility of the primary network versus the number of the SUs. The utility of the primary network under the proposed CSL-optimal-relay-selection is larger than those under NCLS-optimal-relay-selection and CSLrandom-relay-selection, since the PUs can obtain extra revenue from the cooperation and the optimal relay selection strategy. When the number of the SUs is smaller than that of the primary users, the performance of all the three schemes increase as the number of the SUs increases. When the number of the SUs is larger than that of the primary users, the performance of CSL-randomrelay-selection is flat and the performance of NCSLoptimal-relay-selection is increasing slightly; however, the performance of CSL-optimal-relay-selection is still increasing as the proposed scheme can effectively exploit the cooperative diversity. Furthermore, we can see that the performance of the two schemes with cooperation is larger than the one without cooperation; therefore, the PUs would like to actively cooperate with the SUs for extra benefit. The primary network benefits from not only the spectrum leasing, but also the cooperation with the SUs. Comparing the CSL-optimal-relay-selection scheme with CSL-random-relay-selection scheme, we know that the performance of the primary network under the scheme with optimal relay selection is better than that with the random relay selection. Fig. 4 illustrates the utility of the secondary network. Obviously, the utility under the proposed scheme is larger than those under NCLS-optimal-relay-selection and CSLrandom-relay-selection. Under the precondition that the PUs lease spectrum to the SUs, the utilities of the schemes with optimal relay selection are better than that of the random relay selection, and they are increasing as the number of the SUs increases; in the two schemes with optimal relay selection, the SUs can exploit the spatial diversity especially when the number of the SUs is larger than that of the PUs, while the utility of the scheme with random relay selection is flat due to inefficient diversity exploiting. The utility of our proposed scheme is better than the NCSL-optimal-relay-selection scheme, since the SUs can rent more spectrum time from the PUs for their cooperation with the PUs. The utility of NCLS-optimalrelay-selection is better than that of the CSL-randomrelay-selection, as the secondary network can rent more spectrum, and it mainly benefits from the spectrum leasing.
From the above simulation results and analysis, we know that the utility of the secondary network mainly benefits from the spectrum leasing. This is identical with the results shown in Fig.5 . Under our proposed scheme, the secondary network can rent the most spectrum time compared with the other two schemes. We assume all the SUs have the same traffic demand and there are 15 secondary users in the system. We investigate how the traffic demand of the SUs affects the performance of the primary and secondary network. Fig.6 shows the total rented spectrum time of the secondary network versus the traffic demand of the SUs. The rented time of the secondary network, as expected, is increasing as the traffic demands increase, since the secondary network needs to rent more spectrum time to satisfy its traffic demand. This is for the same reason as explained above in that the rented time under our proposed scheme is the largest. It is shown that, in Fig. 7 , the utilities of the primary network of the three schemes all decrease as the traffic demands of the SUs increase. The primary network will obtain more revenue from spectrum leasing to the secondary network, as it rents more spectrum time to satisfy the traffic demand. However, there is less spectrum time left for their own transmissions, and the energy saving of the primary network is decreasing; the utility of the primary network is obtained by not only the spectrum leasing but also the energy saving through cooperation. Therefore, synthetically considering the two aspects, the utility decreases. 8 shows the utility of secondary network versus the traffic demand of the SUs. The SUs rent more spectrum to satisfy their traffic demands and improve the utility of secondary network by increasing the data rate of the SUs. However, the secondary network needs to pay more for the rented spectrum time and dramatically decreases the total utility. Still under our proposed scheme, the utility of the secondary network is the highest as it exploits the cooperative diversity and adopts the optimal relay selection.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we formulate a cooperative cognitive radio system model, where multiple secondary users coexist with multiple primary users over multiple channels. The primary users would like to lease a portion of the spectrum to the proper secondary users for some revenue, and the secondary users actively cooperate with the primary users and help them relay the data in return for some spectrum time. We formulate the spectrum leasing and relay selection problem as a multi-seller and multi-buyer market model. We decompose the problem as two coupled sub-problems, adopt the Stackelberg game to solve the spectrum leasing problem and then use Hungarian method to obtain the optimal relay selection problem. Simulation results show that under the proposed scheme, both the primary and secondary network can benefit from the cooperative spectrum leasing and optimal relay selection.
